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By EDWARD H. RABIN*
PROBABLY every literate American has heard of the population explo-
sion. There is no need to recite the dreary and by now familiar sta-
tistics heralding an age of overcrowding, starvation, and despair. There
is a need, however, to examine population policy explicitly, critically,
and deliberately. A rational population policy is more likely to be
achieved if the alternatives, the tradeoffs, and the drawbacks are ex-
plicitly examined than if decisions are made by indirection or default.
There are, of course, various views concerning the gravity of the prob-
lem in the United States. Since this question has been amply debated
elsewhere,1 the debate will not be repeated here. It should suffice to
* A.B., 1956; J.D. 1959, Columbia University. Professor of Law, University
of California at Davis.
1. It is impossible to list here even a fraction of the books and articles on
population problems. However, a few of the more useful sources are set forth below.
Extremely comprehensive but somewhat outdated are the Hearings on S. 1676 Before
the Subcomm. on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Senate Comm. on Government
Operations, 89th Con., 1st Sess. (1965-1968). The hearings were conducted during
the period 1965-1968 under the leadership of Senator Gruening and can be said to
mark the beginning of serious governmental involvement in the population problem.
The initial hearings were held in 1965 and were printed in parts 1, 2A, 2B, 3A,
3B, 4, the appendix, and an index. The second series of hearings, held in 1966,
were printed as parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5A, 5B and an index. The third series, held in
1967-68, consists of parts 1, 2, 3, and 4, part 4 being the index. See also Hearings on
S. 2701 Before a Subcomm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
The best annotated bibliography that the author is familiar with is A Sourcebook
on Population, 25 POPULATION BULL (Nov. 1969). This source book groups the vari-
ous authorities by subject matter and gives competent comments on most of them.
Berelson, Beyond Family Planning, STUES IN FAMILY PLANNING 1 (No. 38, 1969) is
a comprehensive catalog of possible approaches to population control keyed to an ex-
tensive bibliography and as such is extremely helpful. The Future Population of
the United States, 27 PoPULATION BuLL. (Feb. 1971) contains a well-balanced dis-
cussion of possible future trends and is strongly recommended. CoMmissioN ON Popu-
LATION GRowH AND THE AMERICAN FutURE, POPULATION AND THE AMERICAN FTruRE
(1972) is an indispensable document. Unfortunately, this article was written before
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say that many responsible and informed Americans believe that the pos-
sibility of creating financial incentives to discourage excessive popula-
tion growth is worth exploring. The growing interest of the legal com-
munity is evidenced by the number of law review articles on popula-
tion problems that have been published in the last few years.2
the report was published and thus it was impossible to do more than advert to it
here.
An exhaustive study of financial incentives, concentrating on the Indian experi-
ence is E. POHLMAN, INCENTIVES AND COMPENSATIONS IN BIRTH PLANNING, Carolina
Population Center Monograph 11 (1971). See also E. POHLMAN, HOW TO KILL
POPULATION (1971). Probably the most influential of the polemical works in this
field is P. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (2d ed. 1971), urging immediate and
drastic remedies. The findings and implications of the important 1965 National Fer-
tility Study are set forth in L. WESTOFF & C. WESTOFF, FROM NOW TO ZERO (1971).
See also N. RYDER & C. WESTOFF, REPRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1965
(1971). A noteworthy article arguing that the population problem is not as serious
as many believe is Wattenberg, The Nonsense Explosion, THE NEW REPUBLIC Apr. 4
& 11, 1970, at 18. In addition, census figures recently released indicate dramatic re-
cent declines in the fertility rate. See generally ZPG NATIONAL REPORTER, Oct. 1971,
at 8 (summary of highly publicized report released by Washington Center for Metro-
politan Studies). It is probably too early to tell whether these declines are merely a
temporary aberration.
2. Blaustein, Arguendo: The Legal Challenge of Population Control, 3 L. &
Soc. REV. 107 (1968); Clark, Law as an Instrument of Population Control, 40 U.
COLO. L. REV. 179 (1968); Claxton, Population and Law, 4 NATURAL RES. REP. 113
(1971); Cook, World Population Prospects, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 634 (1966); Dembitz,
Should Public Policy Give Incentives to Welfare Mothers to Limit the Number of
Their Children?, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 130 (1970); Falk, World Population and Interna-
tional Law, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 514 (1969); Friedman, Interference wvith Human
Life: Some Jurisprudential Reflections, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1058 (1970); Hardin,
Population, Biology and the Law, 48 J. URBAN L. 563 (1971); Lamm, The Reproduc-
tive Revolution, 56 A.B.A.J. 41 (1970); Moore, Legal Action to Stop our Population
Explosion, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 314 (1963); Montgomery, Population Explosion and
United States Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 629 (1971); Nanda, Need for a Global Popula-
tion Policy-Now, 17 DENVER L.J. 17 (1970); Pilpel, A Dissenting Viewpoint: Should
Public Policy Give Incentives to Welfare Mothers to Limit the Number of Their
Children?, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 146 (1970); Symposium-Population Control, 25 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 377 (1960) (articles by Shimm, Cook, Stamp, van Loon, Osborn,
Tietze, St. John-Stevas, Fagley, Mauldin, Jaffe, Bronfenbrenner & Buttrick, Back, Hill
& Stycos, Argarwala, Sulloway, and Miller); Symposium-Defusing the Population
Bomb, 6 TRIAL, Aug.-Sept. 1970 (articles by Egeberg, Packwood, and Stans); Sym-
posium-Population Control, 24 VAND. L. REV. 465 (1971) (articles by Greenawalt,
Golding & Golding, and Spengler); Symposium-National Population Programs and
Policy: Social and Legal Implications, 15 VILL. L. REV. 785 (1970) (articles by
Giannella, Shultz, Tien, Wishik. Driver, and Means); Note, Environmental Problems of
an Expanding Population, 35 ALBANY L. REV. 82 (1970); Comment, Population Con-
trol: The Legal Approach to a Biological Imperative, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1414 (1970);
Note, Legal Analysis and Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1856 (1971) (very comprehensive); Note, Population Control in the Year
2000-The Constitutionality of Placing Anti-Fertility Agents in the Water Supply, 32
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The idea of deliberately using law to restrain population growth
may seem radical, but it would seem less radical if it were more generally
recognized that population policy is already influencing judicial and
legislative decisions. For this reason this article is divided into two
parts: First, how have population considerations already influenced
the decisional or statutory laws of the state or federal governments?
Second, what proposals currently being discussed are constitutionally
permissible?
I. Population Control Motives Are Already
Affecting Judicial and Legislative Decisions
A. Abortion
The liberalization or repeal of laws regulating abortion is rarely
advocated or defended on the ground that it will help control popula-
tion.' Typifying the prevailing attitude is the view of President Nixon:
"From personal and religious beliefs I consider abortion an unacceptable
form of population control."4  Nevertheless, it seems likely that the
marked reversal in legislative and judicial attitudes on abortion, coming
as it does during a period of widespread concern over the population
question, was significantly influenced by the existence of the population
problem itself.
Perhaps never before in Anglo-American jurisprudence has there
been a greater reversal in law and public attitudes than in the abortion
area. The common law prohibited abortions after the quickening of the
child,5 and as late as 1966 the statutes of all fifty states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia prohibited abortions.6 Most of these states recognized
an exception to the statutory prohibition of abortions only when it was
OHIO ST. L.J. 108 (1971); Note, The Brave New World: Can the Law Bring Order
Within Traditional Concepts of Due Process?, 4 SuFFOLK U.L. REv. 894 (1970); Note,
Constitutional Problems of Population Control, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 63 (1970).
3. But see, e.g., Note, Abortion Reform: History, Status and Prognosis, 21 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 521 (1970).
4. WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Apr. 10, 1971, at 598.
The statement was made in explanation of the president's directive that the policy
on abortions at American military bases in the United States correspond with the laws
of the states where those bases are located.
5. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *198; see State v. Prude, 76 Miss. 543,
24 So. 871 (1899).
6. E.g., George, Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Movements for Reform,
17 W. REs. L. REv. 371, 375-77 (1965); see also Lucas, Federal Constitutional Limi-
tations on the Enforcement and Administration of State Abortion Statutes, 46 N.C.L.
REv. 730 (1968); Roberts & Skelton, Abortion and the Courts, 1 ENVIRONMENT L.
REv. 225 (Spr. 1971); Ziff, Recent Abortion Law Reforms, 60 J. CIum. L.C. & P.S. 3
(1969).
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necessary to save the life of the mother. Four states did not even
specifically allow this exception.7 At the same time, the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code, which promulgated a moderately liberal-
ized law, had been rejected in Illinois, Minnesota, New York, and
New Hampshire.8  No state had ever held its abortion laws uncon-
stitutional and prosecutions under them were routinely upheld.
Only four years later the law concerning abortion had completely
changed. As of January 1, 1971, at least seventeen states had liberal-
ized their abortion statutesf The most liberal abortion statute in the
country was that adopted by New York, which only five years before
had rejected even the mildest relaxation of the law's prohibitions."°
The states which liberalized their laws were of almost every con-
ceivable type. Our two most populated states, New York and Cali-
fornia, as well as some of our smallest states were included. Also in-
cluded were states with proportionately large Catholic populations
(Maryland, New York, California) as well as proportionately small
Catholic populations (North Carolina). The sparsely populated
(Alaska, Colorado) and the densely populated (Maryland) were
included. Even a federal bill to liberalize abortions has been intro-
duced-but not passed"-and numerous state abortion statutes have
been found unconstitutional.' 2 Although the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a District of Columbia abortion law in 1971, it
7. See George, supra note 6, at 375-76.
8. See generally George, supra note 6, at 375-96.
9. Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas,
Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Caro-
lina, Virginia, and Washington (by referendum).
10. George, supra note 6, at 396.
11. See S. 3746, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
12. E.g., Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971), appeal docketed sub
nom. Hanrahan v. Doe, 40 U.S.L.W. 3018 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1971) (No. 70-105) (de-
claratory and injunctive relief granted); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga.
1970), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3016 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1970) (No. 70-40) (plain-
tiff was successful in obtaining declaratory judgment but court refused to grant in-
junctive relief); Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), appeal docketed,
40 U.S.L.W. 3015 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1970) (No. 70-18) (same); Babbitz v. McCann,
310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1 (1970) (same); People v.
Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 915 (1970); People v. Barksdale, 18 Cal. App. 3d 813, 96 Cal. Rptr. 265
(1971), appeal docketed, Criminal No. 15866 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Sept. 22, 1971); see Doe
v. General Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 1170 (D.D.C.), a 'd in part, 434 F.2d 423 & 427 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). But see Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970);
Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970);
People v. Pettegrew, 18 Cal. App. 3d 667, 96 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1971), appeal
docketed, Criminal No. 15841 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Sept. 8, 1971).
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construed the statute in such a way as to make it extremely difficult
to enforce.'8 Perhaps even more striking, the three men respectively
responsible for pioneering the liberalized abortion laws in Colorado, Cali-
fornia, and North Carolina a scant four years later were seeking to re-
peal their own legislation. Not satisfied with a "liberalization" of the
abortion laws, they were now seeking outright repeal of all legislation
purporting to regulate abortion.' 4
Although majority public opinion in this country recoils from ac-
knowledging abortion as an acceptable method of family planning,"
it is a fact that abortion is an effective and frequently used method of
birth control. In both Japan and Eastern Europe, for example, the
easy availability of abortions has contributed significantly to the low
birth rates prevalent in those countries. 16 It is highly unlikely that
these facts were unknown or unappreciated by those responsible for the
recent changes in laws affecting abortion. Nor is it likely that the oc-
currence of abortion reform at precisely the time when concern about
overpopulation became widespread was entirely coincidental.
B. Contraception
Within the past five years many state statutes prohibiting or re-
stricting the sale of contraceptives have been repealed or liberalized;' 7
others have been judicially declared invalid.' 8  At least one of the
reasons for this development has been concern over excessive population
growth. In Griswold v, Connecticut9 the Supreme Court held that the
13. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70-71 (1971).
14. ZERO Popr.uLroN GRowTH NAT'L R P., Jan. 1971, at 11-12; letter from Ar-
thur H. Jones to author, Aug. 28, 1970.
15. It is noteworthy that the Family Planning Services and Population Re-
search Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-67 (1970) provides that none of the funds appro-
priated shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.
16. See Clark, supra note 2, at 186; India: A Bleak Demographic Future, 26
Por. uAroN BuLL. 8 (Nov. 1970); The Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1970, at A19, col.
1 ("Romania banned legal abortions in 1966 and since then the birth rate has jumped
from 14.3 to 27 per 1,000 population."); Tietz, The Demographic Significance of
Legal Abortion in Eastern Europe, 59 EuGENICS Rnvmw 232 (Dec. 1967).
17. For example, California Business and Professions Code § 4322 was amended
in 1969, Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1435, § 1, at 2943, to liberalize the rule concerning
the advertising of contraceptives. Similarly, liberalizing amendments have been made
in Missouri, Mo. Rav. SrAT. § 563.300 (Supp. 1971), and Wyoming, WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-105 (Supp. 1971).
18. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 40 U.S.L.W. 4303 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). But see Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746,
247 N.E.2d 574, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1029 (1969).
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1357May 19721
Connecticut law restricting the use of contraceptive devices was un-
constitutional, principally because it infringed upon an ill-defined con-
stitutional "right of marital privacy." Learned commentators went hur-
rying to their libraries and thereafter solemnly intoned that there was
indeed a right of marital privacy which protected the use of contracep-
tives. A querulous critic might have asked why this particular mani-
festation of the constitutional right of marital privacy was recognized
(established?) in 1965 rather than in an earlier day. In no sense
could the decision be considered incremental. Although a few earlier
decisions were cited by the Court, these decisions did not require, and
scarcely even suggested, the decision in Griswold. None of the opin-
ions in Griswold (there were six) made any mention of the popula-
tion explosion or of the need to control population growth in this coun-
try or abroad.2" The Justices, however, were not unaware of the prob-
lem. The brief for the appellants contained a three page section en-
titled "The Problem of Overpopulation" which referred to the now fa-
miliar statistics and sources documenting the seriousness of the prob-
lem."1 Three years before Justice Douglas wrote the Court's opinion
in Griswold, he had shown his concern over excessive population
growth:
Conditions worsen with the mere passage of time. Twenty-five
percent of the world's population has 75 per cent of the income.
Two thirds of the people of the world live on or below a subsistence
level. And the world's population is doubling every forty-two
years.
22
And in the very year that he wrote the Griswold opinion Justice Doug-
las reiterated his concern:
Ecology includes people. To discuss ecology without discussing
people is theoretically possible, but practically it is nonsense. We
are a part of the chain of life on this earth-a particularly im-
portant part in that we alone have the power to consciously mold
the environment, for good or for evil. The doubling of the present
human population that is predicted for the 21st century will have a
tremendous effect on the environment, but exactly what it will be
we do not know. . . . But the conservation ethic of which we
have been speaking demands that we face the future squarely and
cast out plans in vast dimensions. 23
20. But see the concurring opinion of Justice White in which he states that
Connecticut has no policy of promoting population expansion. Id. at 505.
21. Brief for Appellant at 72-74.
22. W.J. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY'S MANIFESTO 16 (1962).
23. Douglas, A Wilderness Bill of Rights, in 1965 YEARBOOK OF THE ENCY-
CLOPEDIA BRrrANNicA 79 (1965). See also W.J. DOUGLAs, TowARDS A GLOBAL FED-
ERALISM 129-30 (1968): "Populations are multiplying 3 percent annually, doubling ev-
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In retrospect it seems unlikely that a decision removing restric-
tions on the dissemination of information concerning contraceptive de-
vices, written by a judge who had previously expressed himself on the
problem, was not influenced by the already gathering storm of concern
over excessive population growth. It is true that Justice Goldberg, in
his concurring opinion in Griswold, stated quite clearly that the state
could not prevent married couples from having as many children as
they desired, but his vote, in contrast to his opinion, was concerned
only with the right of couples to have as few children as they desired.
C. Sterilization
In one sense Griswold and those cases which held abortion laws
invalid were easy cases. 24 The policies favoring population control
were re-enforced by policies favoring the individual's freedom from gov-
ernmental interference. This combination proved weightier than reli-
gious-philosophical arguments and those based on deference to legisla-
tive judgments. Where the policy against excessive population growth
runs counter to that protecting individual liberty, the results, as might
be expected, reflect the confusion inherent in the reconciliation of
competing policies.
In Buck v. Bell the .Court upheld the compulsory sterilization of
the feeble-minded mother of a feeble-minded child. The mother was
also the offspring of a feeble-minded parent. In an oft-quoted laconic
aside Justice Holmes, writing the Court's opinion, observed that "three
generations of idiots are enough."25  Although Justice Holmes was
concerned with the quality of the population (he wanted to avoid being
"swamped with incompetence") rather than the quantity, it is fair to
characterize the decision as favoring society's interest in population con-
trol over an interest in individual dignity. In contrast, in Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson26 individual dignity was found to be
weightier than any societal interest present in that case. In Skinner
cry generation, and multiplying eighteen fold in a century. The situation is so serious
that according to the experts the Time of Famines will begin by 1975 .... A con-
centrated attack on problems holding back agricultural production is one front. The
other is all-out population control efforts."
24. On the other hand, when attention is focused on the rights of the foetus,
the issue becomes very difficult indeed. Among the innumerable books and articles on
the subject the following are particularly recommended: D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION:
LAW, CHOicE AND MonRALrrn (1970); THE MoALrrY or ABORTiON (I. Noonan ed.
1970).
25. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
26. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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the Court (per Justice Douglas) struck down an Oklahoma statute
providing for compulsory sterilization of certain types of habitual crimi-
nals. Although the principal stated ground of the decision was that
these criminals were denied equal protection because other types of crim-
inals were not subject to sterilization, it seems likely that it was the in-
vasion of the personal dignity of the individual without any rationally
defensible 21 countervailing state policy that was decisive, rather than
the fact that other criminals did not also have their personal dignity
invaded.' .s
Both Buck and Skinner involved involuntary sterilization for os-
tensibly eugenic reasons. It is sobering to learn that most such pro-
grams in recent years have been totally or partially abandoned as scien-
tifically unsound.29 One hopes that current schemes to curb population
growth are not similarly based on scientific misconceptions.
In the area of voluntary sterilization the picture is clearer. With
the single exception of Utah,30 all states permit voluntary sterilizations,
and the number of voluntary sterilizations is increasing at a very rapid
rate.31 In Jessin v. County of Shasta32 the court ordered the county
to perform a voluntary nontherapeutic surgical sterilization free of
charge upon a medically indigent person who requested it. The pur-
pose of the operation was candidly admitted to be birth control. The
court squarely rejected the county's half-hearted objection that the op-
eration might be considered to be against public policy.
3
It is obvious that the comparatively benign view that the law
has taken of voluntary sterilization has been affected by a fear of over-
population. In Custodio v. Bauer, for example, the court rejected the
view that voluntary sterilization was against public policy and buttressed
27. There was no showing that the type of criminality involved was an inherita-
ble trait.
28. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (referring
to "fundamental rights and liberties" and citing Skinner).
29. See generally Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer,
27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591 (1966); Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis,
46 DENVER L.J. 631 (1969).
30. UTA CODE ANN. §§ 64-10 to -12 (1951).
31. See the various informal publications of the Association for Voluntary
Sterilization, Inc., especially its Progress Report, issued irregularly.
32. 274 Cal. App. 2d 737, 79 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1969).
33. Id. at 747-48, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66; ef. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.
2d 303, 317, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472 (1967) (sterilization operation for therapeutic pur-
poses not contrary to public policy); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41
(Lycoming County 1957) (contract to perform sterilization operation not void as
contrary to public policy).
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its argument by stating that perhaps "Malthus was indeed right
" 34
D. Welfare Policies
The most recent Supreme Court welfare case touching upon pop-
ulation control is Dandridge v. Williams.35 In that case the Court
upheld Maryland's imposition of a maximum ceiling on welfare pay-
ments to one family regardless of the size of the family. Among the
grounds used by Maryland to justify its practice was the argument that
such a ceiling would encourage large families to practice family plan-
ning. The Court refused to consider this ground, holding that other
reasons were sufficient to justify the ceiling. Similarly, the lower
court, which was reversed by the Supreme Court, noted in striking down
the regulation that the desire to encourage family planning was a pur-
ported justification for the regulation, but it refused to consider this
argument seriously. Again, one wonders whether the Court's stated
refusal to examine seriously the family planning implications of a limi-
tation of welfare payments to large families should be taken at face
value.
The Court's refusal to acknowledge that population implications
influenced its decisions in cases such as Griswold and Dandridge may
mean that in fact the population implications of decisions which had
population impact were ignored. If so, this is a very serious charge
indeed. I suspect, however, that the implications were considered but
not expressed because of the Court's reluctance to set out upon such an
uncharted sea, at least until the journey cannot be avoided. That time
may soon be upon us.
E. Federal Legislation
Until recently, federal attempts to provide family planning assis-
tance to actual or potential welfare recipients were timid and ineffec-
tual.3" As late as the early sixties, the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare simply ignored inquiries about family planning serv-
ices.3 7 Gradually the attitude changed, and this change culminated in
34. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967).
35. 397 U.S. 471 (1970), discussed for its population implications in Note,
Legal Analysis and Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARv. L. REv.
1856 (1971).
36. For a thorough and knowledgeable discussion see Shultz, Federal Population
Policy: A Decade of Change, 15 VILL. L. RFv. 788 (1970).
37. Id. at 792.
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the Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970."s
The act has two notable features. First, it affirmatively and un-
equivocally puts the federal government on record as favoring and
supporting family planning. Second, it recognizes that family plan-
ning is related not only to health and welfare, but also to population
problems. This latter aspect will, I believe, prove significant. Al-
though the attitude evidenced by the new act is revolutionary when
seen in the context of the prior law, it will seem old-fashioned to
many who advocate even more drastic changes.
Section 6 of the act provides that none of the funds appropriated
under it shall be used "in programs where abortion is a method of
family planning." In view of the current trend toward legalizing abor-
tions and making them a customary part of family planning, I predict
that this particular clause will not remain on the books for more than
a decade.
More important in the long run, however, the existing law is de-
signed to make "comprehensive voluntary family planning services read-
ily available to all persons desiring such services," not to encourage
people to want such services.39 The omission did not go unnoted. On
38. 84 Stat. 1504, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-6 (1970).
The purposes of this act, as set out in section 2 thereof, were as follows:
Section 2. It is the purpose of this Act-
(1) to assist in making comprehensive voluntary family planning services
readily available to all persons desiring such services;
(2) to coordinate domestic population and family planning research with the
present and future needs of family planning programs;
(3) to improve administrative and operational supervision of domestic family
planning services and of population research programs related to such services;
(4) to enable public and nonprofit private entities to plan and develop compre-
hensive programs of family planning services;
(5) to develop and make readily available information (including educational
materials) on family planning and population growth to all persons desiring such
information;
(6) to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of family planning service pro-
grams and of population research;
(7) to assist in providing trained manpower needed to effectively carry out
programs of population research and family planning services; and
(8) to establish an Office of Population Affairs in the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare as a primary focus within the Federal Government on mat-
ters pertaining to population research and family planning, through which the Sec-
retary of Health, Education, and Welfare (hereafter in this Act referred to as the
"Secretary") shall carry out the purposes of this Act.
39. See Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, 42
U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970). See also 42 U.S.C. § 300a-5 (1970) which provides that the
acceptance by any individual of family planning services or family planning or popu-
lation growth information "shall be voluntary and shall not be a prerequisite to eli-
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June 2, 1971, a joint resolution, "[t]o declare a United States policy of
achieving population stabilization by voluntary means," was introduced
to the Senate by Senators Alan Cranston and Robert Taft.4 0 Twenty-
five additional senators were co-sponsors. On August 3, 1971, the
House version was introduced by Representatives Morris Udall and
Frank Horton;41 it had eighteen additional House co-sponsors. Omitting
the hortatory preamble, the resolution read as follows:
[I]t is the policy of the United States to encourage and develop,
at the earliest possible time, the necessary attitudes and policies,
and to implement them by actions which will, by voluntary means
consistent with human rights and individual conscience, stabilize the
population of the United States and thereby promote the future
well-being of the citizens of this Nation and the entire world.
Thus the idea of a national policy to limit population growth (as op-
posed to a mere family planning program) was beginning to receive re-
spectable support.
F. Summary
Population control motives are playing a tacit, but influential, role
in recent legislative and judicial decisions. As a result of these motives,
at least in part, legislative restrictions on abortion, voluntary steriliza-
tion, and the sale of contraceptives have been removed or liberalized.
More significant, however, is the candid legislative recognition of the
population problem in the Family Planning Services and Population Re-
search Act of 1970. Finally, the influence of the population problem
has been noted in connection with Supreme Court decisions invalidat-
ing restrictions on sale of contraceptives and upholding maximum
welfare payments to a family regardless of family size.
The balance of this article is devoted to the question left unan-
swered by the proposed joint resolution for "population stablization."
Can the federal (or state) government go beyond the simple act of
providing free or inexpensive family planning aid and, in fact, create
a system of financial incentives and penalties designed to encourage
family planning and discourage natality?
I. Financial Incentives to Limit Population Growth
Some writers have suggested that compulsory or coercive measures
gibility for or receipt of any other service or assistance from, or to participate in, any
other program of the entity or individual that provided such service or information."
40. SJ. Res. 108, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
41. H.RJ. Res. 837, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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to limit population growth are realistic possibilities. 42 However, at least
for the near future it appears extremely unlikely that any such drastic
measures will be attempted. Financial incentives, on the other hand,
do appear to be a reasonable possibility,43 and hence the remainder of
this article will explore their possibilities and ramifications.
A. Can Financial Incentives Be Effective?
Some experts believe modern Americans want only enough child-
ren to replace themselves and excess numbers are due to accidental or
unwanted births.44 Accordingly, they argue that once a perfect contra-
ceptive is developed and made available to all, the United States popula-
tion problem may more or less solve itself. Yet even these researchers
do not believe that the problem "of influencing people to want fewer
children should be ignored, especially since this number could shift
upward again."45  Other experts believe that the problem of motivating
families to want fewer children not only should not be ignored, but
should have top priority.
46
There is much experience concerning various governmental pro-
grams to promote fertility but little experience with financial incentive
programs to inhibit fertility. In general, it is doubtful whether any
governmental program to promote fertility has been successful. Be-
cause of the similarity with the United States in cultural and economic
conditions, the Canadian experience is especially significant. Canada
has long had a system of children's allowances paid to a family for each
dependent child. Although the program was a child welfare program,
not a program to promote population growth, one might expect that
42. See, e.g., E. CHASTEEN, THE CASE FOR COMPULSORY BIRTH CONTROL (1971);
Montgomery, supra note 2, at 638, 647; Note, 32 OHIo ST. L.J. 108, supra note 2.
Hardin, supra note 2 at 567-68, makes the frightening point that a voluntary or semi-
voluntary system of birth restraint (e.g. financial incentives) would discourage only
those with the weakest procreative desires thus tending to create a nation of people
with strong procreative desires ("philoprogenitive couples"). Thus in the long run a
system of semi-voluntary controls might result in higher and higher fertility. Irrespec-
tive of the merits of Hardin's position it would still seem that, as a practical matter
financial incentives will be tried before coercive measures.
43. See POHLMAN, supra note 1, at 7 ("[lIt is only a matter of time until massive
[financial] incentives become accepted as a necessity in population control.").
44. Bumpass & Westoff, The "Perfect Contraceptive" Population, 169 Sci. 1177
(1970).
45. Id. at 1181.
46. See, e.g., Berelson, Beyond Family Planning, STUDIES IN FAMILY PLAN-
NING 1 (No. 38, 1969); Davis, Population Policy: Will Current Programs Succeed?
158 ScI. 730 (1967); Spengler, Population Problem: In Search of a Solution, 166 SC.
1234 (1970).
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such a program of giving cash payments for each dependent child
would also tend to stimulate fertility. A careful study of this possi-
bility concludes that the allowance programs "have had no appreciable
effect on the birth rate. '47  This conclusion is reached both by compar-
ing the Canadian birthrate before and after the institution of the
children's allowance, and also by comparing Canadian with United States
birth rates over an extended period of time. This study also notes
that the blatantly pronatalist programs of Fascist Italy and Nazi Ger-
many, involving substantial financial benefits for fertility, had no signif-
icant impact on the birthrate.48
On the other hand, it is widely accepted that the steep drop in
the birth rate during the 1930's was attributable to the economic de-
pression. But it has also been shown that the relation between eco-
nomic conditions and birth rates in the United States is speculative at
best.40 From the cited study it may be surmised that although the De-
pression coincided with and possibly caused a reduced birth rate, in-
creased prosperity does not necessarily result in an increased birth-
rate. 50 Can it be that financial incentives promoting production of
children are generally ineffective whereas financial factors are ef-
fective to prevent the production of children? Put another way, one
can argue that people rarely decide to have children because the cost
will be largely subsidized by the government, but they frequently
decide not to have children when they feel they cannot afford it. That
is, reducing the disincentive (expense) of child rearing does not neces-
sarily have the same effect, proportionately, as increasing the disincen-
tive by additional tax or other devices.
Perhaps the phenomenon is more understandable if an analogy is
made. Halving the price of lettuce may increase consumption by only
10 percent, although doubling the price of lettuce may reduce con-
47. J. VADAxN, CImDREN, PoVmRnY, AND FAMIY ALLOWANCES 96 (1968).
48. Id. at 98. See also Population References Bureau, Sweden, A Nation that
Developed a Set of Population Policies, 26 POPULATION BULL. (Nov. 1970) (suggest-
ing that Sweden's pro-natalist policy had only limited effect); E. Pohlman, supra note 1,
at 105-07 (concluding that effect of pro-natalist policy unclear).
49. Population Reference Bureau, The Future Population of the United States,
27 POPULATION ButL. 21-24 (Feb. 1971). But see Easterlin, Does Human Fertility
Adjust to the Environment, Am. EcoN. Rav. (May 1971) arguing that there is a clear
long-run relationship.
50. See also Simon, The Effect of Income on Fertility, 23 POPULATION STUDES
327, 340 (1969) (concluding that the effect of incentive payments for higher and
lower fertility is just about a complete unknown); Whitney, Fertility Trends and Chil-
dren's Allowance Programs, in CUMDREN'S ALLOWANCFS AND THE ECONOMIC WELFARE
OF CHILDREN 123 (E. Bums, ed. 1968).
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sumption by 50 percent. So here, halving the cost (price) of children
through a child allowance or subsidy program may increase childbirths
by only 10 percent whereas doubling the cost of children, through
taxes, may decrease the number of children by 50 percent.5 ' All of
this is purely speculative since no attempt at population control by
means of a system of tax incentives has been tried in an affluent, liter-
ate, country such as the United States. It is set forth to show only
that because children's allowances have not, in other countries, in-
creased population growth does not prove that disincentives would not
substantially decrease population growth. Various possible disincentives
are discussed below.
B. Income Tax Changes
1. Limiting or abolishing the income tax exemption for children
a. The Packwood Plan
Senator Packwood has introduced a bill to limit the number of
personal exemptions allowable for children; 52 its purpose is to discour-
age population growth.5 Under this bill there would be no personal
tax exemption for children born after 1972 unless these children were
first or second born children. In effect, the bill provides that a tax-
payer would be entitled to exemptions for his first two children but for
no others. This measure is unsound because at best it discourages only
third, or later children. Yet in 1968 (the last year for which figures
are readily available), only 37 percent of all registered births were
third or later born. More significantly, the clear trend, as shown by
the table below, has been for higher percentages of all births to be first
or second born, and of the decreasing percentage who are third or later
born a large percentage are born into nontaxpaying families. For ex-
ample, when one compares white with nonwhite registered births we
can see that although the difference is diminishing, nonwhite registered
51. An economist would say that the demand for children may be elastic at
higher prices and inelastic at lower prices. As a matter of economic theory incentive
payments for births (or non-births) should have a far greater effect than a mere rise
(or fall) in real personal income. Incentive payments for births lower the price of
children while holding all other prices constant, whereas a rise in income has the
effect of lowering the price (relative to income) of all goods including children, more
or less equally.
52. S. 3632, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); accord, Colo. H.B. 1087, 47th
Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1970).
53. See generally Packwood, Incentives for the Two-Child Family, 6 TRIAL,
Aug.-Sept. 1970, at 13.
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births contain a significantly higher percentage of third or subsequent
born than white.
Percentage of Registered Births which are First or Second Born54
All White Nonwhite
1968 63
1967 61 62 53
1966 59 60 50
1965 55 57 47
1964 53 55 44
1963 52 53 42
1962 51 53 41
1961 51 53 41
1960 51 53 41
1959 52 54 41
Since, on the whole, nonwhite families have significantly lower in-
comes than white families the denial of the exemption for the third or
later child would in many cases either have no effect (since that child
is likely to be born into a nontaxpaying family) or disproportionately
burden lower income families.55 Since 63 percent of all children born
in 1968 were first or second born and hence would not be affected
by the Packwood proposal, since this figure has been steadily increas-
ing, and since of the 37 percent remaining a disproportionate number
are in nontaxpaying families, the probable effect of such a proposal
would be minimal.
Two alternatives to the Packwood proposal are suggested. First,
the complete abolishment of the exemption for children; second, a com-
promise proposal.
b. Completely abolishing the exemption for children
As shown above, a tax program designed to discourage births
which has no effect on first or second births is ignoring 63 percent of
54. Compare BtJREAu oF Ti CENsuS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMmRCE STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF TE UNITED STATE--1970, table 59 [hereinafter cited as STA-TSTICAL
ABSTRACT], with NATIONAL CENTER OF HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH SERvIcEs AND
MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES, U.S. DEF'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE, 1 VrrAL STATISTICS OF THE UNrTED STATES, NATALIny 1-9,
tables 1-8 (1967).
55. About 19% of the welfare mothers in New York City have five or more
children. Dembitz, supra note 2, at 135, citing WELFARE hiN NEw YoRK Cry, 4
BULLETIN OF CENTER FOR NEW YORK CITY AFFAiRS OF NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL
RESEARCH3 (Feb. 1970).
May 19721 POPUITION CONTROL
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the problem. 50 If the current personal exemption has any effect at all
on the birth rate (which is doubtful), its effect of encouraging the pro-
duction of the first two children-which affects 100 percent of all
mothers-far overshadows its effect of encouraging third or fourth
children.
It is not supposed that many couples will consciously forego par-
enthood because of the abolition of the personal exemption. However,
the complete absence of the exemption might tend to cause some fami-
lies to forego a third child far more effectively than merely denying
a deduction for a third child. The actual financial hardship of raising
two children without a deduction may effectively discourage the produc-
tion of a third, whereas the mere prospect of a denial of the deduction
for the third child might have little effect. Perhaps equally important,
the denial of a deduction for the first child may cause its postponement.
This would have two effects: First, it would incidentally reduce the
likelihood of a third child. Second, the postponement itself would
tend to slow the overall population growth by increasing the gap be-
tween generations.
c. Compromise plan
It may be argued that the complete abolition of the personal ex-
emption (for children born after the statute) is too extreme a measure
and that the Packwood measure, being more moderate, is more likely
of success in becoming enacted. A possible alternative, taking this
objection into account, would be to urge the exact opposite of the Pack-
wood measure. That is, to permit no exemption for the first three
children, and to permit only modest exemptions for additional child-
ren. An analogy to this proposal may be found in the current tax
provision relating to the medical deduction under which a deduction is
allowed only for extraordinary expenses and none is allowed for the
usual medical expenses.5 7  Similar provisions relate to personal casu-
alty losses under which the deduction is allowed only to the extent
that the loss exceeds $100.58 Another analogy is that relating to the
standard deduction; taxpayers who do not wish to itemize their deduc-
tions (i.e., who have no extraordinary deductions) may take the stand-
56. Looked at another way, every mother has had a first birth whereas only
roughly half of all mothers will have more than three children. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SER. P-20, No. 203, CURRENT POPULATION RE-
PORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS I (1970).
57. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213.
58. Id. § 165(c)(3).
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ard deduction.59 Similarly, under this proposal those who have no "ex-
traordinary" expenses of parenthood (i.e., those who have three or
fewer children) would not be entitled to an exemption. Although at
first glance this might seem to reward the large family, this view is
misleading. Any encouragement of fourth children would be more
than offset by the removal of the existing encouragement for the first
three children. And even if the total abolition of the personal exemp-
tion for children (born after the proposed law) might be ultimately
more desirable from a population viewpoint, it is probably too abrupt
a break with the past to be feasible today.
From a tax equity standpoint it is more just to give the exemp-
tion for the fourth child than for the first three since a four child family
needs tax relief more than a two child family. There would be no true
inequality involved since both the three child and the four child family
would bear an equal burden in that neither would be receiving a tax re-
duction for their first three children.
Seen another way, the anomaly of the Packwood proposal is more
striking. Under the Packwood proposal a childless couple would pay
$x in tax, a couple with two children would pay $x-y in tax, and a
couple with ten children would also pay $x-y. Under the suggested com-
promise plan a childless couple and a couple with two children would
pay $x, and a couple with ten children would pay $x-z. Is it not
fairer and more humane to impose the same tax on the childless couple
and on the two child couple than it is to impose the same tax on the
two child couple and on the ten child couple? Since, as argued above,
permitting the exemption only for the fourth and subsequent children
will do more to inhibit unwanted population growth than prohibiting
the exemption for the third and subsequent children, I submit that the
former is preferable.
The average mother at the end of her childbearing years has had
three children. 0 If an exemption were given for the first three, the
denial of an exemption for the fourth would not discourage her fer-
tility since she would have no more children anyway. On the other hand,
if an exemption were given only for fourth or later children, then
more people would be affected by the denial of the deduction for the
first three than would be affected by the allowance of the exemption for
the fourth.
59. Id. §§ 141-45.
60. BuREAu OF T=E CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, S.R. P-20, No. 203,
CUNT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARAcTamsTics 15, table 7 (1970).
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2. An Income Tax Surcharge on Children
Even the total abolition of the personal exemption as suggested
above would probably not have a serious effect upon the birthrate.
The increased financial burden would probably not be of sufficient
magnitude to affect the family planning of most parents. It is also
doubtful whether the abolition of the joint return option for married
taxpayers would have any effect 6' since the difference between taxes
paid by married and unmarried people in the same income bracket
is not large. Even if marriages were strongly discouraged by our tax
laws, it is not believed that this would have any effect upon the birth-
rate; severe tax penalties on formal marriage would only encourage in-
formal unions which would probably be just as fertile as the formal
ones.
Obviously, whatever form they take, tax disincentives should not
be applied so as to penalize existing large families. Such a penalty
would have no deterrent effect since the "harm" has already occurred,
and would constitute a ludicrous, possibly unconstitutional, attempt to
punish the "offense" of procreation after the fact. 62 But assuming
that the ex post facto problem can be easily solved, what form of tax
penalty would be desirable?
There are several possibilities. For example, one could have a
low rate for childless couples, and a higher basic rate for couples with
children no matter how many. This system would have the advantage
of placing maximum impact upon the event of the first child. If the
first child is delayed a couple might adjust to a childless state and
be reluctant to changes its status or the total number of children might
be sharply reduced. Since most population growth in the United States
is due to the one, two, or three child family, encouraging a significant
portion of such families to be childless would have a more pronounced
population effect than a tax program which only hit families of three or
more children. The strength of such a tax scheme is also its weakness:
it has maximum impact upon the first child and no impact upon subse-
quent children.
An alternative plan would be to impose one rate upon families
with two or fewer children and a different and higher rate upon larger
families. Although such a tax would hit the more "culpable" fami-
61. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6013.
62. Although such a penalty might not technically be unconstitutional, see Flem-
ming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), it would be most unjust.
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lies it would probably have little impact upon our population growth63
since it would have no effect on the majority of births. For example,
a surcharge of 10 percent over the otherwise applicable income tax
rate might be charged for the first child and a lesser surcharge of, say,
5 percent for each additional child. Under the suggested percentages
if a childless couple of x income would pay $1,000 in tax, with one
child it would pay $1,100 in tax, and with five children it would
pay $1,300 in tax.
The $100 surcharge for one child and the $50 surcharge for each
additional child may not seem like a great deal when applied to a fam-
ily which was already paying $1,000 in income tax, but in fact it is a
considerable financial disincentive. It is an increase of income tax of
30 percent for a large family. This expense must be added to the al-
ready significant out-of-pocket expense of raising a large family. And
since the surcharge would be paid with "after-tax" dollars, if the fam-
ily were in the 25 percent income tax bracket it would have to earn
$400 in order to have the cash necessary to pay the tax surcharge of
$300.64
Although the tax surcharge might seem small, it would serve two
very important functions. First, the existence of any surcharge, no
matter how small, would have an educational and public relations
value: it would force every taxpayer who filled out a return to be
aware of a governmental antinatalist policy. Second, it would estab-
lish the principle of using the tax laws for population control and con-
stitute a precedent for more severe tax penalties in the future should
these become necessary.
About 15 percent of all children under eighteen are in "poor"
families which pay little or no tax.65 Obviously, a tax surcharge
would not affect the habits of these families. As to such families addi-
tional financial penalties would be neither feasible nor desirable, since
they already suffer severe deprivation for each additional child. Even
if we assume that the penalty could be collected (a highly doubtful
proposition) the net result would probably be merely increased depriva-
tion of an already deprived family rather than any significant decrease
in fertility.
The fertility of the large poor family is largely due to a lack of
63. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
64. Of course a surcharge would be "unfair" in that it would tax a large family
more heavily than a small one. See text following note 56 supra. The unfairness is
ameliorated, however, by the progressive nature of the income tax.
65. STATISnCAL ABsmAcr, supra note 54, at 322, table 513.
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access to birth control information and other social and cultural fac-
tors, rather than to financial considerations. As a substitute for the
tax surcharge, other methods would have to be used to affect the pop-
ulation growth of this segment of the population. The most useful
method would be expanded family planning and abortion services. It
has been authoritatively estimated that most, if not all, of the high
fertility of low income families is attributable to the birth of children
not actually desired by their parents.6 6  Under these circumstances in-
tensive counseling should have maximum effectiveness. In addition,
a program of cash payments for sterilization might be effective for low
income families.6 7
C. The Constitutionality of a Tax Surcharge
What constitutional issues would be raised by a tax program which
required parents to pay a greater tax than people without dependent
children? There are six paragraphs in the United States Constitution
specifically dealing with taxation.68 Of the six, two deal with taxes on
exports or imports and are not relevant to the present discussion. 9
The requirement of "uniformity" imposed by article I, section 8, clause
1 is merely geographical" and can be easily met by following the cus-
66. L. Bumpass & C. Westoff, The "Perfect Contraceptive" Population,
169 Sci. 1177 (1970); Jaffee, Family Planning and Poverty, J. MARRIAGE & FAMILy
467-68 (Nov. 1964).
67. See text accompanying notes 158-66 infra.
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3: "Representatives and direct taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and
excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons." This clause was
amended by the Fourteenth Amendment, section 2, relating to apportionment of Rep-
resentatives, and by the Sixteenth Amendment.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imports and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common de-
fense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4:
"No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or
enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5: "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported
from any state."
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 2: "No State shall, without the consent of the Con-
gress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports .. "
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI: The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
69. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 9, cl. 5; id. § 10, cl. 2.
70. Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 583 (1937); Head Money
Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884).
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tomary and proper practice of not distinguishing on the face of the tax
statute between various sections of the country. The mere fact that in
actual practice one part of the country might have more children pro-
portionately than another and thus bear a greater portion of a "child
tax" would be irrelevant so far as the requirement of uniformity is
concerned. More substantial questions are raised by the remaining
clauses. First, would such surcharges be "taxes on income" within
the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and thus be relieved from
any requirement of apportionment among the states? 1 Second, if such
a tax were not deemed an income tax, would it be a "capitation or other
direct tax" as that term is used in Article 1, section 9, and thus be
required to be apportioned among the states?72 Finally, assuming that
for whatever reason the tax would not have to be apportioned, would
such a tax be objectionable on the grounds that it was not for the
"general welfare," or that it infringed on states' or individual rights?
73
For the reasons which follow it is concluded that such a tax would not
have to be apportioned and, if carefully drafted, would not be objection-
able on other grounds.
1. The requirement that direct taxes be apportioned
a. Sixteenth Amendment
The Sixteenth Amendment, passed in 1913, provides in its entirety
as follows:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any Census or enumeration.
Would a tax on parents, computed by reference both to the number of
children they have and to their income, constitute an income tax within
the meaning of the amendment? The mere fact that Congress labels
a tax an "income tax" does not necessarily mean that it is such. In
Eisner v. Macomber 4 the Court held that a tax on a dividend paid
in stock (as opposed to a tax on a dividend paid in cash) was not
an income tax within the meaning of the amendment. Although the
particular tax involved may well have been misclassified by the Court
(Holmes, Brandeis and Day dissented) the basic principle that not
everything called an income tax is one was certainly sound:
71. See text accompanying notes 74-89 infra.
72. See text accompanying notes 90-117 infra.
73. See text accompanying notes 118-57 infra.
74. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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[I]t becomes essential to distinguish between what is and is not
"income," as the term is there used; and to apply the distinction,
as cases arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to
form. Congress cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude
the matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution
"75
Such a surcharge could not reasonably be called an income tax.
This becomes apparent when it is realized that this surcharge could, at
least theoretically, result in a tax in excess of a taxpayer's total income.
Suppose a parent were subject to an effective overall tax rate of 60 per-
cent and had fifteen children. Under the tax system under discussion
(a 10 percent surcharge for the first child and 5 percent for each addi-
tional child) the taxpayer would have to pay more in taxes on his in-
come than the sum of his income. Even if we assume that such a tax
is not invalid as a denial of due process 76 it cannot be fairly charac-
terized as an income tax. Admittedly, the hypothetical case just
posed is only a remote possibility, but it does highlight the essential
nature of this tax as something other than a tax on income. Putting
an upper limit on the amount of the surcharge so that it could never
exceed a specified percentage of income would alleviate the hardship,
but would not change the essential nature of the tax as a tax on child-
ren rather than as a tax on income.
Of course, arguments supporting the view that such a tax is an
income tax could certainly be made. For example, numerous cases
have held that rates and deductions are a matter of legislative grace
and that Congress has the power to determine these without judicial in-
terference.77  However, these cases are not in point since they involve
the power of Congress to define the relation between gross income and
taxable income. Although it has been suggested that it may be be-
yond the power of Congress to tax gross receipts without any allowance
for expenses, 78 it would appear that the existing cases at least estab-
lish the principle that the Court will allow considerable discretion to
Congress in defining deductions from gross income and hence taxable
75. Id. at 206.
76. Cf. Davis v. United States, 87 F.2d 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S.
704 (1937) (rejecting both direct tax-apportionment argument and Fifth Amendment-
due process argument).
77. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); Interstate Transit
Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943); Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co.,
292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
Crowe v. Commissioner, 396 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1968) (upholding $600 exemption
against justified charge that this sum grossly inadequate for human support).
78. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918).
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income. An income tax surcharge on parents does not pertain to de-
ductions; neither does it purport to define the relation between gross
and net income. In fact, the very concept of such a surcharge is a
distortion rather than a refinement of net income-the more depend-
ents, the more expenses, and the less net or disposable income.7 9 Yet
the tax surcharge would have the effect of treating parents as having
more gross income than they in fact had, and thus, at least arguably,
could be seen as a tax on something other than income.
Another argument in favor of sustaining the surcharge is to view
it only as a different rate of tax rather than as a tax on something
other than income. Such a characterization, if accepted, would tend to
uphold the surcharge. At the present time different types of income,
such as capital gains,80 interest on tax exempt bonds,81 and the first
hundred dollars of dividend income,8 2 are taxed at different rates de-
pending on their source. Of course the tax surcharge here under dis-
cussion does not involve different types of income, but rather different
types of recipients, i.e., parents versus nonparents. Here again, how-
ever, there are some analogies. Charitable or nonprofit organiza-
tions,8 3 real estate investment trusts,8 4 regulated investment compan-
ies,8 5 partnerships, 0 married couples, 7 and heads of household 8 are
given special tax treatment because of the nature of the recipient
rather than because of the type of income involved. Is the tax sur-
charge comparable? One might argue that since corporations, trusts,
and individuals are all taxed at different rates parents could be taxed
at rates different than non-parents without changing the nature of the
tax from an income tax to some other kind of tax.
Yet another argument is that the surcharge in substance, if not in
form, is similar to starting with a higher basic tax and giving taxpayers
a deduction for every child which a taxpayer does not have. If the
tax took such a form there would be no surcharge as such but only a
deduction wholly or partly unavailable to parents, and since deduc-
79. Cf. Pohlman, supra note 1, at 31 ("It may appear conspicuously cruel to
put special taxes on those with the most mouths to feed.")
80. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201-11.
81. Id. § 103.
82. Id. § 116(a).
83. Id. §§ 501-26.
84. Id. §§ 856-58.
85. Id. §§ 851-55.
.86. Id. §§ 701-71.
87. Id. § 1(a).
88. Id. § 1(b).
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tions are traditionally a matter for Congressional discretion, 9 parents
might have no grounds, and possibly not even standing, to complain.
Despite the arguments that could be made in favor of treating
the tax surcharge (or a device similar in substance if not in form) as a
tax on income, I am inclined to accept the arguments made at the be-
ginning of this section that such a tax would not be an income tax pro-
tected from the requirement of apportionment by the Sixteenth Amend-
ment. If the surtax is not an income tax within the meaning of the
Sixteenth Amendment (and at least arguably it is not) then it would
have to be apportioned among the states in accordance with population
if it is a "capitation or other direct tax."
b. Capitation taxes
Some writers have suggested9" that a tax on children might be a
capitation or direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution and
hence subject to the requirement of apportionment. This question is
worth considering seriously because additional taxes upon larger fami-
lies are among the population control measures which are most likely
to be considered seriously, and if such measures were ever adopted,
vigorous litigation by religious and other groups would likely raise the
direct tax question quite early. For the reasons which appear below, it
is my own opinion that such a tax is not a direct tax and need not
be apportioned, although substantial arguments can certainly be made
to the contrary.
The Constitution does not prohibit capitation or other direct taxes.
It does provide, however, that "[n]o capitation or other direct tax shall
be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbe-
fore directed to be taken." 91 In the early years of our republic several
direct taxes were laid and apportioned in accordance with the census,92
but it is now generally conceded that it is both administratively imprac-
tical and politically unfeasible to levy a tax which would have to be
so apportioned. However, it is worth bearing in mind that there is no
prohibition of direct taxes as such, and that apportioning taxes in accord-
ance with the census is always a possibility.
89. See cases cited in note 77 supra.
90. Note, Constitutional Problems of Population Control, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
63, 82-83 (1970).
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, quoted
in full note 68 supra.
92. See Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 572-73, aff'd on
rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (citing and summarizing the direct tax acts of 1798,
1813, 1815, and 1861).
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Is an income tax surcharge for children a "capitation or other
direct tax" within the meaning of Article 1, section 9, clause 4? A
"capitation" tax is often said to be a "poll" tax or a "head" tax. It
could be argued that a tax structure, which under any guise imposed,
in effect, a higher tax upon larger families is a "head," "poll" or "cap-
itation" tax. One could further argue that this case is distinguishable
from one in which the higher tax was a mere incidental and largely
unintended side effect of a tax which was not intended to be a head
tax. Thus, for example, a sales tax might fall more heavily on the
larger family because of the larger purchases it makes, but would not
for this reason be considered a head tax.
The Supreme Court has never held any tax imposed by Congress
to be a capitation tax. And although it has held, on one occasion,93
that a certain tax was not a "capitation tax," judicial authority on what
is or is not a capitation tax within the meaning of the Constitution is
extremely slim. In Hylton v. United States94 the Court was faced with
a tax on carriages. In dicta, however, it referred to "a capitation or
poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession or any other
circumstances."9" In Crandall v. State of Nevada the State of Nevada
levied "a capitation tax of one dollar upon every person leaving the
State by any railroad, stage coach, or other vehicle."96  In striking
down the statute as being an undue interference with the right of travel
the Court had no occasion to determine, and did not attempt to de-
termine, whether the tax involved was a capitation tax even though
it was so called in the statute.9 7 The Head Money Cases9 s is perhaps
the only Supreme Court case in which it was argued that an act of
Congress imposed a capitation tax without apportionment. 99 The Court
pointedly ignored the argument, and in upholding the tax, implicitly
ruled that it was not a capitation tax since it most assuredly was not
apportioned. The tax there involved imposed a duty "for each and
every passenger not a citizen of the United States, who shall come by
steam or sail vessel from a foreign port to any port within the United
States."'100 The lower court expressly held that the tax was not a capi-
93. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
94. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
95. Id. at 174.
96. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
97. For a similarly unhelpful case see The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
282 (1849).
98. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
99. Id. at 584-85.
100. Id. at 581.
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tation tax, but rather a tax on the business of transporting passengers,
and cited the dicta of Hylton v. United States quoted above. 101 Breed-
love v. Suttles'0 2 and Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections"3involved
the constitutionality of state poll taxes and thus the issue of whether
these taxes were "capitation" taxes within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion was not involved.
To summarize, only one Supreme Court case has even remotely
ruled on the meaning of "capitation" as it is used in the Constitution.
That case, The Head Money Cases, simply held, without discussion,
that a tax on steamship passengers was not "capitation tax."
In the absence of judicial holdings as to the meaning of the phrase
"capitation tax" it becomes necessary to look elsewhere. What did the
framers of the Constitution mean by that phrase when they used it?
The debates of the Constitutional Convention as reported by Madison
and others are fully indexed, but nowhere is the word "capitation tax"
defined. 0 4 The reason for the term becomes quite obvious from a full
reading of the debates-to effect a compromise between those who
wanted to count slaves for the purpose of full representation in the Con-
gress and those who did not.0 5 Although there was some discussion
as to the meaning of the phrase "direct taxes" and ample discussion
concerning the purpose of the rule concerning capitation and other
direct taxes, the term "capitation tax" is not itself defined. From this
it can reasonably be assumed that the Founding Fathers were familiar
with the term and felt no need to define it, and that in using the term
they were undoubtedly referring to the types of taxes then current in
the colonies which were called "capitation taxes."
Fortunately we have available an invaluable document which
catalogs the taxes then current, and which was prepared in 1796-just
a few years after the convention itself.'0 6 This report was prepared by
the then Secretary of the Treasury, Oliver Wolcott, Jr., to support a plan
101. Head Money Cases, 18 F. 135, 139 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1883); see text accom-
panying note 95 supra.
102. 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
103. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
104. See C. TANSILL, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE
UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 109-745
(1927).
105. See text accompanying note 113 infra.
106. 0. WOLCOTr, DIRECT TAxEs, A REPORT COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, EXEC. Doc. No. 100, 4th Cong., 2d Sess. (1796), reprinted in
1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FINANCE 414 (1832).
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for the laying and collecting of direct taxes "by apportionment among
the several States, agreeably to the rule prescribed by the constitu-
tion.'1 o0 In his report Wolcott describes the taxes extant in each
state, state by state. Many of the states had what Wolcott called a capi-
tation tax. Vermont, for example, had a tax on all male persons
twenty-one to sixty, with exemptions in favor of ministers, the presi-
dent and tutors of colleges, "constant schoolmasters," and persons dis-
abled by sickness or infirmity.1' 8 Massachusetts taxed "all male polls,
including negroes and mulattoes, sixteen years old and upwards . . .
distinguishing the polls of persons sixteen years to twenty-one years
of age, from those of persons twenty-one years of age and upwards
. . . ." Its exemptions included "the polls of the president, fellows,
professors, tutors, librarians and students of Harvard college" among
others.' 09 Connecticut omitted from the lists all persons disabled by
sickness or other infirmity, 110 while Georgia imposed a tax on all free
white males over twenty-one and all slaves under sixty of 37.5 cents, on
all "male free negroes" 50 cents and "[on all professors of law . . .
four dollars.""' Wolcott concludes his lengthy survey as follows, in-
sofar as it relates to capitation taxes.
1st. Uniform capitation taxes, or taxes on persons, without respect
to property, professions, or occupations are imposed in Vermont,
North Carolina, and Georgia. .. . In the other States, this tax is
unknown, the taxes on professions, and certain classes of persons,
and on slaves, not being considered as of this description."
2
Wolcott's conclusion is a bit puzzling. Clearly the capitation taxes of
the states referred to do distinguish between persons on the basis of sex,
age, race, occupation and poverty or disability. Perhaps hea is only
saying that the distinction between adult males who ordinarily pay the
tax and all others is basically trivial. It is interesting to note that while
he calls a tax a capitation tax if it is levied without respect to "prop-
erty, professions, or occupations," the Hylton dicta is broader in that
it refers to a tax levied without respect to "property, profession, or any
107. Id. at 414.
108. Id. at 418.
109. Id. at 420.
110. Id. at 423.
111. Id. at 436. The dignity of the law teaching profession is not enhanced by
the full text of the statute. "The sum of four dollars on all professors of law and
physic, and the sum of fifty dollars on all billiard tables." Law No. 590, 1797
WATiNas DIGEsr OF THE LAws OF GEORGrA, 1755-99, at 646, 648, quoted in Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 171 (1947).
112. WOLcoTr, supra note 106 at 437.
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other circumstance." Under the Hylton dicta an income tax surcharge
on children would not be a capitation tax because it would take into
account the income of the father, the dependency status of the child,
the number of children in the family, whether the child was an adopted
child and perhaps other matters. Under Wolcott's conclusion such a tax
might be called a capitation tax because it would not consider "prop-
erty, professions, or occupations . . . ." And since the statutes as he
describes them do take into account age, sex, race, and even to some
extent occupation and disability, and are still called capitation taxes by
him, it could be argued that the income tax surcharge on children
could also be called a capitation tax.
One thing is clear however: the proposed income tax surcharge
on children does not resemble any of the capitation taxes then in exis-
tence in the colonies and perhaps for that reason alone should not be
called a "capitation tax." Since the issue is fairly debatable, its reso-
lution should depend on the reason for the apportionment require-
ment with respect to capitation and direct taxes. If the reason were
furthered by calling the proposed tax a capitation tax it might properly
be so designated; if the reason for the original requirement were not
furthered by such a designation, then it should not be. The historical
reason for the direct tax clause has been exhaustively and ably ana-
lyzed.113 These studies and the debates themselves make it abundantly
clear that the rule of apportionment of capitation and other direct taxes
was designed solely as an expedient way of solving the problem of how
slaves were to be counted for purposes of representation. Gouverneur
Morris had proposed the measure to make it easier for the Southern
states to accept the compromise which counted slaves as only 3/5 of
other persons for purposes of representation. This bitter pill for the
Southern states was made easier to swallow by Mr. Morris' proposal that
they count as only 3/5 of others for purposes of taxation. With the
freeing of the slaves the original purpose of the capitation and direct
tax clauses has disappeared, and thus these clauses should not be given
an expansive interpretation.
14
Apart from the fact that the historical reason for the apportion-
ment rule has long since disappeared, there is another reason why this
113. See Bullock, The Origin, Purpose and Effect of the Direct-Tax Clause of the
Federal Constitution, 15 POL. SCI. Q. 217 & 452, especially at 232-39 (1900); Morrow,
The Income Tax Amendment, 10 COLuM. L. REv. 379, 391-400 (1910).
114. See E. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 559 (1911), quoted in B. BITKER, FED-
ERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATIONS 5, n.5 (3d ed. 1964).
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rule should be given a restrictive interpretation: it is totally unwork-
able. The argument that the rule of apportionment is unworkable and
thus should be strictly construed was ably made by Justices Paterson
and Iredell in their opinions in the Hylton case, which held that a tax
on carriages was not a direct tax, largely on the ground that it would
be impossible to apportion a tax on carriages. It is noteworthy that
the government's case was argued by Alexander Hamilton, among oth-
ers, and that the opinions of Paterson and Iredell were undoubtedly
influenced by Hamilton's argument that any tax which could not prac-
tically be apportioned should not be considered a direct tax."- 5
The resolution of the issue whether an income tax surcharge on
children would be a capitation tax can be summarized as follows. A
surcharge such as the one here contemplated was unknown to the colo-
nies at the time of the Constitution and hence there is no compelling
reason to classify it as a capitation tax. Moreover, the only substan-
tially contemporaneous judicial utterance defining a capitation tax, the
Hylton dicta, would not classify this tax as a capitation tax. Jn addi-
tion, the historical reason for the rule concerning capitation taxes
(the slavery question) has long since disappeared. Furthermore,
since 1796, it has been recognized that the rule of apportionment is
usually unworkable, and that therefore the Court should be reluctant to
classify any tax as a capitation or direct tax when the tax cannot
feasibly be apportioned. 1 6 In short, the argument that a surcharge on
children would be a capitation tax is not capable of objective resolution
because no such tax existed during colonial times, and it is thus im-
possible to state whether, if such a tax had existed, it would have been
considered a capitation tax. On the basis of all the historical evidence,
however, including the reason for the capitation clause, I conclude that
although such a tax has some features which resemble the capitation
taxes which then existed, it is extremely unlikely that the Supreme Court
would hold the surcharge a "capitation tax.""117
115. Morrow, supra note 113, at 402.
116. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, alf'd on rehear-
ing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), the Court did hold that an income tax on rents was a direct
tax on land and hence subject to the rule of apportionment. However, that decision
has been almost universally condemned and the effect of the Pollock case was, of
course, greatly reduced with the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment.
117. It is conceivable that the tax could be classified as a direct tax other than a
capitation tax. If such a classification were adopted (and if the tax were not an in-
come tax within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment) then the tax would have
to be apportioned. However, since the tax would be neither on land nor the produce
of land, it is extraordinarily unlikely that if the tax were not deemed a capitation tax
it would still be considered a direct tax.
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2. Possible Infringement of Constitutional Rights
a. State rights
It was suggested above that there would be no need to apportion
among the states an income tax surcharge on children. However, there
are other possible constitutional objections to such a tax. To what
extent may the national taxing power constitutionally be used to regu-
late natality? Would use of the taxing power to influence natality
be considered an unconstitutional abuse of the taxing power?
Let us assume, for purposes of argument, that Congress would
have no power to regulate natality directly."1 8 In the Child Labor Tax
Case' 9 the Court struck down a tax measure imposing punitive or con-
fiscatory taxes upon companies employing child labor. The Court held
that
the so-called tax is a penalty to coerce people of a State to act
as Congress wishes them to act in respect of a matter completely
the business of the state government under the Federal Constitu-
tion.32 0
It distinguished a number of previous cases which had upheld tax
measures which had obvious regulatory as well as revenue purposes.'
2'
The difference between a valid measure and an invalid measure, it
appeared, was that a valid measure must have a reasonable and sub-
stantial connection to the raising of revenue even though it would also
have an incidental regulatory effect.
Similarly, in United States v. Constantine22 the Court struck down
a special excise tax of $1,000 on a retail dealer in malt liquor who was
violating state law. The Court held that, under all the circumstances
present, the intent to punish violations of state law was so strong in
comparison to the revenue producing features of the bill that it could
not be upheld. 23
The more recent cases, however, have upheld federal revenue
118. Compare Means, The Constitutional Aspects of a National Population
Policy, 15 ViLL. L. REV. 854 (1970) (finding federal authority only in the treaty
making power and thus relying on the migratory bird cases!), with Montgomery,
supra note 2, at 641-45 (finding ample power in the commerce, spending, taxing, and
general welfare clauses).
119. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
120. Id. at 39.
121. Id. at 40-43. See United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919); Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904);
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
122. 296U.S. 287 (1935).
123. Id. at 296.
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measures which were, at least arguably, mainly regulatory measures
and which would be invalid if they contained no revenue element. In
Sonzinsky v. United States12 4 the Court sustained a tax on firearms
and noted that it was not free to speculate as to the motives of the
tax.'25  In United States v. Sanchez 26 the Court upheld the Marijuana
Tax Act and noted that the tax was "a legitimate exercise of the taxing
power despite its collateral regulatory purpose and effect.' 27  Sim-
ilarly, in United States v. Kahriger'2 8 the Court upheld a tax on per-
sons engaged in the business of accepting wagers, although presumably
the federal government could not constitutionally regulate such persons
directly.
Although the more recent cases have clearly tended to uphold reve-
nue measures having strong regulatory effects it should be noted that
most of the regulations affected criminal activity without any scintilla
of redeeming social value or constitutional protection. That the Court
has upheld a tax scheme discouraging the sale of marijuana is not
conclusive evidence that it would uphold a scheme which discouraged
births. One key element in determining the constitutionality is the
revenue effect of the tax statute; if it would raise very little revenue, it
would be seen mainly as regulatory and would be more likely to be
struck down. A surcharge of 5 percent for every child a couple has
would be a very substantial revenue device. And unlike the various
measures which have been struck down (as indeed some of the mea-
sures which have been upheld) imposition of the tax would not destroy
or eliminate the taxed activity (natality), although it would have the
effect of any tax of discouraging the taxed activity. The omission of
explicit regulatory features would also tend to uphold the statute's con-
stitutionality. As important as the lack of explicit regulatory features
is the fact that the surcharge would be a part of the income tax-a
tax which is clearly constitutional in its other features.
b. The Individual's Right of Procreation
To what extent and in what sense does there exist a constitution-
ally protected "right of procreation"? Would the proposed surcharge
be an unconstitutional interference with such a right? There is suffi-
cient language scattered throughout the Supreme Court reports to sug-
124. 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
125. Id. at 513-14.
126. 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
127. Id. at 45.
128. 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
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gest that there is a constitutionally recognized right of procreation. Mr.
Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut'29 said:
While it may shock some of my Brethren that Court today holds
that the Constitution protects the right of marital privacy, in my
view it is far more shocking to believe that the personal liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution does not include protection against
such totalitarian limitation of family size, which is at complete
variance with our constitutional concepts. Yet, if upon a showing
of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing voluntary birth
control by married persons is valid, then, by the same reasoning,
a law requiring compulsory birth control also would seem to be
valid. In my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably
intrude upon rights of marital privacy which are constitutionally
protected.1 0
In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson' the Court struck down a
compulsory sterilization law.
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are funda-
mental to the very existence and survival of the race . . . . Any
experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury.
He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.13
2
Similarly, in Meyer v. Nebraska the Court stated that the right "to
marry, establish a home and bring up children" was an essential part
of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
13
Also of interest in establishing the contours of our concept of or-
dered liberty or fundamental rights, and hence of constitutional pro-
tection, are the statements of various official or quasi-official interna-
tional bodies.' 4 The Declaration on Population by World Leaders,
signed by the heads of governments of thirty countries including the
United States provides that "the opportunity to decide the number and
129. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
130. Id. at 497.
131. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
132. Id. at 541.
133. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); ci. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942); Maslow v. Maslow, 117 Cal. App. 2d 237, 241, 255 P.2d 65, 68 (1953) ("One
of the prime purposes of matrimony, by the laws of nature and society, is procrea-
tion.").
134. For an extremely thorough exposition of all U.N. pronouncements and ac-
tions in this field see J. Halderman, Programs of the United Nations and Associated
Organizations, 1970 (mimeographed materials prepared for the Population Council and
available from the Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University, Durham, North




spacing of children is a basic human right."'13 5 In December 1967
Secretary General U Thant commented on the declaration. He stated
that "[t]he Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes the fam-
ily as the natural and fundamental unit of society. It follows that any
choice and decision with regard to the size of the family must irrevocably
rest with the family itself, and cannot be made by anyone else."'
1 3 6
The Second International Conference on Human Rights, held in Tehe-
ran in April-May 1968, also recognized, in its Resolution XVII, that
[plarents have a basic human right to determine freely and responsibly
the number and spacing of their children.' 37  In Eisenstadt v. Baird,
however, the Court deliberately declined to decide whether the right not
to bear a child is a fundamental constitutional right. Instead, in striking
down a state statute regulating the distribution of contraceptives the
Court relied -on the equal protection clause which, it held, required that




The recent case of Graham v. Richardson"' has an important
bearing on this issue. The Graham decision was almost unanimous:
eight of the nine Justices adopted both the opinion (written by Black-
mun, J.) and the decision, and the remaining Justice, Harlan, adopted
the decision and part of the opinion. 39 In the course of deciding
that the States could not withhold welfare benefits from aliens because
of their alienage, the Court inserted a sentence which, to forgive a pun,
was pregnant with meaning.
Appellants' attempted reliance on Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970), is also misplaced, since the classification involved in
that case (family size) neither impinged upon a fundamental con-
stitutional right nor employed an inherently suspect criterion.'
40
Clearly, the Court was implying that distinctions between large and small
families were constitutionally permissible in appropriate cases. This
was the basic holding of Dandridge and in itself is not surprising. But
was the Court also implying that the "right" to a large family was not
a "fundamental constitutional right"? Possibly so. On the other
hand, perhaps the Court was merely saying that although there may or
135. U.N. ECOSOC, POPULATION Div., POPULATION NEWSLTTER, No. 1, at 44
(April 1968).
136. Id. at 43.
137. Id. No. 2, at 22 (July 1968).
137a. 40 U.S.L.W. 4303, 4308 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1972).
138. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
139. Id. at 383.
140. Id. at 376.
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may not be a fundamental constitutional right to a large family, the
rule in Dandridge did not impinge on such a right. Time alone will
reveal the true meaning of this Delphic observation.
The quoted statement says nothing that strengthens the argument
that the right to a large family is a fundamental right, and perhaps it
says something that significantly weakens this argument. It is neces-
sary to make an important distinction. There are two possible rights
which should not be confused: the "right to reproduce" and the
"right to multiply." Put another way, there is a difference between the
"right" to have children, and the "right" to have many children. It
is one thing to say that a man may not have any children; it is another
thing to say that he may not have more than x number of children.
The emotional need for "immortality" through one's offspring does not
require an unlimited number of offspring. Justice Blackmun, in the sen-
tence quoted above, seems to be making this distinction, albeit very
obliquely.
The Graham case, however, also cuts the other way. It squarely
holds that whenever a statute impinges upon a fundamental right
(whether or not such right is also a constitutional right) it will be sub-
ject to "strict scrutiny" and will be upheld only if it is necessary to
further a compelling state interest. 4 ' Thus if the right to procreate is
deemed fundamental, it would be protected whether or not it could be
"ascribed to any particular constitutional provision. 1 4 2 Assuming that
there is at least some kind of constitutionally protected right of pro-
creation, the next question is whether the surcharge would be an un-
constitutional interference with that right.
c. The Tax as an Unconstitutional Interference with a Right of
Procreation
Of course not every statute which has an adverse impact upon a
fundamental right is invalid. In Skinner v. Oklahoma the Court recog-
nized procreation as a basic right, while at the same time citing with
approval Buck v. Bell,'43 which upheld the sterilization of imbeciles
under certain circumstances. Similarly, the income tax may be im-
posed on newspapers although they clearly would be adversely affected
by it in some degree or other, and they are exercising a fundamental
141. Id. at 375-76.
142. See id.
143. 274 U.S. 200 (1927); see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 541-42.
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First Amendment freedom. In, addition, Sunday closing laws have been
upheld although they work a disadvantage to certain religions. 44
But where a fundamental- right is involved, a statutory classifi-
cation which infringes upon that right will be subject to "strict scrut-
iny," and statutes rarely are upheld when they are so scrutinized.'45
How can one distinguish between the case where a fundamental right
is merely "affected" and the case where it is "infringed"? One factor
is whether the affected activity is being singled out for especially onerous
treatment or whether it is merely being given no special favors. For
example, if newspapers had to pay an income tax computed at a rate
higher than that applicable to comparable businesses this would prob-
ably be considered an unconstitutional infringement on freedom of
press.
In Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.,146 the Court unanimously invalidated
a federal statute which sought to withhold second class mailing privi-
leges from certain kinds of magazines while granting such privileges to
magazines with different editorial content. In line with this case it
could be argued that although large families are not necessarily enti-
fled to pay less taxes than smaller families, any tax scheme which singled
such families out for greater taxes might constitute an invalid tax be-
cause it would single out the protected fundamental activity of procre-
ation. And even if one could justify the tax as a revenue measure
only, the method used-singling out large families-might seem to
throw an impermissible burden on the exercise of a fundamental right.
However, this might be justified on the ground that the tax is reasonably
related to the costs imposed on the taxpayer by the government. That
is, since a family of three children requires more governmental services,
in the form of schools, police protection, and other services, it could
reasonably be asked to contribute more than a family with only one
child.
Another argument in support of the surcharge is that under the
present system parents are able to externalize a part of the cost of a
child's upbringing, whereas the surtax would internalize these costs in
144. E.g., Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
145. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (welfare laws); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956) (fee for appellate review); Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (ster-
ilization). For a penetrating discussion of these and related cases see Brest, Book
Review, 23 STAN. L. RFv. 591 (1971).
146. 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
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accordance with sound economic theory. Perhaps the major objection
to this line of reasoning is that it tends to emphasize the resemblance
of this tax to the "capitation tax" and thus runs the risk of failing be-
cause not apportioned among the states.'47
The case of Speiser v. Randall'48 might be used to attack the pro-
posed surcharge. In that case the Court struck down a California prop-
erty tax exemption which was conditioned on the taxpayer's swearing
that he did not belong to any subversive organizations. The Court ob-
served that "the denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain
speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to re-
frain from the proscribed speech."' 49  The same argument could be
made here: the imposition of the surcharge will necessarily coerce
taxpayers into not exercising their fundamental right of procreation.
The differences, however, are sufficiently significant to make the argu-
ment unpersuasive. The tax surcharge could be defended as a ra-
tional revenue measure making those who derive greater benefits from
government pay more, and also as furthering a compelling interest in
discouraging excessive population growth.
By itself, the argument that the surtax merely charges parents
with the costs that they impose on society, would probably not with-
stand constitutional attack. The state probably cannot condition the
exercise of a fundamental right upon the payment of a fee or charge,
no matter how modest, even though the fee charged merely covers the
expenses involved. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections"'
the Court was faced with a question similar to the "child tax" discussed
herein. The State of Virginia imposed an annual poll tax not exceed-
ing $1.50 upon every resident over twenty-one years of age and made
payment of the poll tax a prerequisite for voting. The net effect was
to impose a small fee for voting. The Court held the measure uncon-
stitutional under the equal protection clause: "We conclude that a
State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an
electoral standard."'' Although the Fourteenth Amendment by its
147. See text accompanying notes 90-117 supra.
148. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
149. Id. at 519; cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Seventh-Day Ad-
ventist refused unemployment compensation for refusal to work on Saturdays).
150. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
151. Id. at 666. "We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and
liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might
invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined. See, e.g.,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62;
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terms is directed to the states rather than to the federal government,
the requirements of equal protection would be applied to the federal
government under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.152
It is noteworthy that in Harper, Justice Douglas, speaking for the
Court, referred to Skinner v. Oklahoma which struck down a com-
pulsory sterilization statute. Thus, Harper struck down a poll tax which
made it more difficult for the poor to exercise a fundamental right
(voting) than for the rich, and Skinner v. Oklahoma, which was cited
in Harper, indicates that the right of procreation is also a funda-
emental right analogous to that involved in Harper. The two cases read
together suggest that any taxing scheme which bears more heavily on
the poor's right to procreate than upon the affluent is objectionable
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
proposed surtax, however, would not bear more heavily, proportion-
ately, upon a poor man than upon the rich man because it would be
computed as a fixed percentage of the ordinary or base income tax.
Thus, it would reflect the same progressive rate structure that the in-
come tax, without the surtax, would reflect. It is for this reason that
the surtax is distinguishable from the poll tax and is fairer than, for
example, a tax on babyfood which does not vary with the taxpayer's
ability to pay.
153
Although the Court treated it as such, Harper is probably not a
poor versus rich case. That is, even if the poll tax had been gradu-
ated according to ability to pay it is doubtful the Court would have
upheld it. The real rationale behind Harper was probably that it was
impermissible to burden the exercise of a fundamental right, voting,
with any extraneous impediments. In contrast, such cases as Douglai
v. California,'54 Griffin v. Illinois,5 ' or Boddie v. Connecticut,56 which
did rely upon a poor versus rich distinction required free access to the
courts only for the indigent. Perhaps a distinction between Harper and
these cases could be made on the ground that the other cases involved
payment of fees designed to defray the cost of providing the service
(court fees and other legal fees), whereas there was no suggestion in
Carrington v. Rash, supra; Baxstrom v. Herold, ante, p. 107; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 580-81 (Black, J., concurring)." Id. at 670.
152. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948).
153. Professor Paul Ehrlich has suggested a tax on diapers as well as other meas-
ures. P. EroLicH, THE POPULATION BomB 13 (rev. ed. 1971).
154. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
155. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
156. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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Harper that the poll tax was implemented to help defray the cost of
the elections. If this is the distinction, then a graduated surcharge justi-
fied both as an attempt to proportion taxes of governmental costs and
as an attempt to further the compelling governmental interest in dis-
couraging excessive births would be upheld. This prediction is strength-
ened by the fact that the tax can be seen as a straight taxing measure,
valid because it raises considerable revenue.
One further development suggests that the surtax would be upheld
as against an equal protection or due process attack. The Court has
recently evidenced a tendency not to extend the scope of the equal
protection clause beyond the areas of voting, residency requirements,
and criminal procedure which it has previously delineated. 15
7
So despite the status of procreation as a fundamental right, the
exercise of which cannot be constitutionally taxed under Harper, the
interests of the state in defraying costs and in curbing population are
sufficiently compelling to justify the surtax. Moreover, since the surtax
is based on the taxpayer's ability to pay, it does not involve discrimina-
tion on the basis of wealth-a suspect classification.
D. Programs Not Involving Income Tax
1. Cash payments
An income tax surcharge on fecundity will not affect those fami-
lies which pay, and can pay, little or no taxes because their income is
too small. About 14 percent of all children under eighteen live in fam-
ilies below the poverty level.15 Because these families will be unaf-
fected by the surcharge and because the stick works better when aug-
mented by the carrot, a program of incentives for nonfertility should be
added to the tax disincentive for fertility. Various kinds of incentives
or rewards can be imagined, ranging from an award for "nonmother
of the year" to cash payments for voluntary vasectomies.
Although cash payments for voluntary sterilization have an appeal-
ing administrative simplicity, they raise other problems. First, since
sterilization is often irreversible, and involves a surgical procedure, it is
157. Compare Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding welfare
limitation) and Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (upholding disadvantageous
treatment of illegitimates) and James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding
housing referendum requirement), with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(striking down welfare limitation) and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (strik-
ing down disadvantageous treatment of illegitimates) and Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385 (1969) (striking down housing referendum).
158. STATISTICAL ABsTRAcT, supra note 54, at 322, table 513.
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a method which would be unsuitable for many. Even a large sum of
money might induce only a comparatively small number of sterilizations.
Second, because of the seriousness of the procedure some constitutional
issues might be raised. Perhaps those who wanted the cash award but
did not want to be sterilized could successfully argue that they were
being denied equal protection of the law in that governmental largesse
was being conditioned upon the permanent waiver of a constitutionally
protected right to have children. In Speiser v. Randall59 for example,
the Court struck down a tax measure as unduly infringing upon the right
of free speech. The California tax statute there in issue offered a
tax exemption to certain taxpayers who would sign a statement that they
did not advocate the overthrow of the government by force or violence.
The Court believed that the provision in issue would necessarily have
the effect of dissuading the defendants from the proscribed speech or
advocacy. Similarly, in Sherbert v. Verner'60 the Court struck down an
unemployment compensation statute which conditioned payment of un-
employment benefits on the willingness of the applicant to work on Sat-
urday despite her religious convictions. From these cases one might ar-
gue that conditioning a governmental benefit (whether it be an award
for sterilization, a tax credit, or unemployment compensation) on a
waiver of a fundamental right is unconstitutional. I believe, how-
ever, that such an argument is unsound.
A program of cash payments to encourage sterilization (with
suitable safeguards) is probably no different from cash payments for
the performance of other services of value to the government such as
selling blood, or agreeing not to grow cotton or tobacco. The govern-
ment may award scholarships and grants to students taking certain pre-
scribed courses of study, and yet this does not unconstitutionally in-
fringe upon the rights of others not to study those subjects or to study
different subjects. No doubt there is a constitutional right of pro-
creation, but the deliberate and intelligent waiver of that right, to re-
ceive a cash benefit, is probably not unconstitutional. In Wyman v.
James'61 the Court upheld the right of New York State to condition wel-
fare payments upon a reasonably conducted visit by a social worker to
the home of the recipient. The argument that this procedure improp-
erly required the recipient to waive her Fourth Amendment right to
be secure in her home against unreasonable searches was squarely re-
159. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
160. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
161. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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jected.16 The home visit was seen as a reasonable means of achieving
the reasonable end of properly administering welfare funds. The re-
quired "waiver" of constitutional rights, if it existed at all, was not un-
constitutional. Similarly, in North Carolina v. Alford' 6 3 the Court up-
held a plea of guilty to a second degree murder charge, despite the fact
that the accused, simultaneously with the guilty plea, denied that he
committed the offense. A knowing and informed waiver of one's con-
stitutional right to a trial is not impermissible. What is the difference
between such cases as Speiser and Sherbert, striking down statutes
which require the waiver of certain constitutional rights to receive
governmental benefits, and such cases as Wyman and Alford, uphold-
ing waivers of certain constitutional rights? In the Speiser and Sher-
bert cases, the state had no legitimate need, compelling or otherwise, to
require the waiver. In the Wyman and Alford cases the need
for fair and efficient administration of the welfare and justice programs
was legitimate, and the methods used were reasonably designed to
effectuate that need. Should a compelling need for population con-
trol be adequately demonstrated by qualified demographers, a cash in-
centive program for sterilization would also be upheld.
Although, as suggested above, a program of cash payments for
permanent sterilizations, with suitable safeguards, would probably be
upheld and is administratively simple since there is only one operation
and one payment, it is doubtful whether this would be the ideal method
of using cash payments to reduce the national population growth rate.
Many would find the idea of sterilization either repugnant, unwise, or
unworkable. Professor Joseph Spengler has suggested other methods
of using financial rewards to reduce fertility.' He suggests, for ex-
ample, that social security payments could be made larger for those
persons who, at the age of retirement, have less than x number of liv-
ing children. 6 ' This measure could be defended both on population
grounds and on the ground that persons with a large number of living
children can rely on their children to supplement their social security
payments. It seems to me, however, that the distant prospect of in-
creased social security would have little impact on most couples during
the child bearing years, and there is even less to be gained by reward-
ing a parent for the death of his children. Spengler also suggests that
married couples living together (or perhaps all women between fifteen
162. Id. at 317-18.
163. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
164. Spengler, Population Problem: In Search of a Solution, 166 Sci. 1234 (1969).
165. Id. at 1237-38.
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and fifty?) be given cash payments, perhaps every ten years, if they have
succeeded in avoiding procreation during that period. 66 If, as sug-
gested above, cash payments for sterilization would be upheld, it seems
likely that these measures would also withstand constitutional attack.
2. Denial or Reduction of Welfare Benefits
a. Sterilization
Discussions concerning legal methods of discouraging population
growth sooner or later turn to the issue of punitive or quasi-punitive
sterilization of poor or "unfit" parents. It seems easier for a legislator
who is not poor to envisage sterilization of poor parents, than it is for
him to envisage similar penalties imposed upon middle or upper class
parents. Poor parents, especially those on welfare, are susceptible to
threats to their very means of subsistence, and some legislators find it
difficult to resist the temptation to apply pressure to those least able
to resist it. At any rate, the frequency of proposals to impose steriliza-
tion as a condition of welfare or probation is shocking. 16 7  A useful
1968 study provides a detailed description of both legislative and ju-
dicial attempts to impose sterilization on the indigent or poor parent
who is considered "unfit."' 68  Such attempts (fortunately most of them
unsuccessful) have occurred in California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and Wisconsin,1 69 and they continue to occur down to the
present. For example, an Illinois legislator recently introduced a bill
which would have required a vasectomy or tubal ligation as a condition
for continued public aid for a person who fathered or gave birth to
166. Id. British scientist Aubrey Manning has suggested tax-free bonuses for
every young woman who gets through a year without producing a baby. Washington
Post, Sept. 15, 1970, at A19, col. 1. Similarly, the American physicist William
Shockley has proposed cash bonuses to intellectually substandard individuals who agree
not to have children. NEWSWEEK, May 10, 1971, at 70. See also Montgomery, supra
note 2, at 637-38, 655. Constitutional Problems of Population Control, supra note 2,
at 70-73.
167. Many of these attempts to impose birth control practices on poor people, es-
pecially welfare recipients, have been presented as attempts to discourage sexual
immorality. For a discussion of these attempts see Paul, The Return of Punitive Steri-
lization Proposals, 3 L. & Soc. Rav. 77 (1968). This rationalization is entirely uncon-
vincing since the original argument against contraception or sterilization was that it
tended to encourage sexual immorality. To now attempt to argue that their use will
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three children while on welfare. It would also have provided a $100
payment to each person undergoing the operation.'70
Regardless of whether such statutes are formally compulsory, or
"quasi-compulsory" in that they offer the subject an "option" of un-
dergoing sterilization or foregoing welfare or release from prison, they
are probably unconstitutional as a denial of due process. Buck v. Bell
is the only Supreme Court case that has upheld a compulsory steriliza-
tion statute. 171  In that case the statute specifically required a finding
that the person to be sterilized was afflicted with a hereditary form of
insanity or imbecility, was himself confined to a mental institution,
and there was a specific finding that the patient was a "probable po-
tential parent of socially inadequate offspring."'1 72  In Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,'73 however, the Court struck down a
statute providing for the compulsory sterilization of persons convicted
of two or more felonies.
174
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race. The power to steri-
lize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating ef-
fects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which
are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There
is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any
experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury.
He is forever deprived of a basic liberty. We mention these mat-
ters not to reexamine the scope of the police power of the States.
We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that strict scru-
tiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law
is essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations
are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the
constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws. . . . Oklahoma
makes no attempt to say that he who commits larceny by trespass
or trick or fraud has biologically inheritable traits which he who
commits embezzlement lacks. 175
From the quoted segment two points can be made. First, any
sterilization law is to be strictly scrutinized because of the serious and
often irreparable nature of the operation. Second, to be valid at all, a
170. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1971, at 40, col. 6. The measure was defeated. Id.
171. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
172. Id. at 207.
173. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
174. Although the Court relied on the equal protection clause (certain other
types of criminals were not subject to sterilization), two concurring justices (Stone,
C.J., and Jackson, J.) also relied on the sounder ground of the due process clause.
Id. at 543-47.
175. Id. at 541.
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sterilization statute should be applicable only to a person with defec-
tive traits which are likely to be genetically passed on to his offspring.
This latter requirement is fully consistent with Buck v. Bell.176  Thus
the existing decisions could not support a compulsory sterilization law
applicable to parents with "too many" children, or "too many" illegiti-
mate children or "too many" children which they are unable to support,
since neither fecundity, morality, nor poverty are inheritable traits. It
is possible, of course, that the law could be extended beyond its exist-
ing boundaries to allow sterilization not involving inheritable defects.
Such a development, however, is both unlikely and undesirable. As
noted in the portion of Skinner quoted above, 177 such an invasion of
bodily integrity is to be strictly scrutinized, and countenanced, if at all,
only upon a showing of compelling social need. To permit it for trivial
or speculative reasons would be shocking to any civilized conscience.1
7 8
Also, for the reasons which appear in the section which follows no
such showing of compelling need, based on population control or other
factors, can be shown.
b. Contraception
The Committee on Law and Family Planning of the Section of
Family Law of the American Bar Association has suggested that working
welfare mothers should be subject to a small monetary penalty for each
additional child.
The amount the welfare mother keeps from her wages without de-
duction from her public assistance grant, should decrease a small
amount with each additional child. That is, she should contribute
more from her wages to the family budget as her number of chil-
dren increases. Such a policy would bring her economic situation
into some conformity with that of self-supporting parents for whom
more children mean increased economic stringency.
79
176. See text accompanying note 171 supra. In re Cavitt, 182 Neb. 712, 157
N.W.2d 171 (1968), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 996 (1970), sustained a compulsory
sterilization law which did not provide for a finding of inheritable defects. The force
of this decision is considerably weakened because four out of the seven judges voted
to find the law unconstitutional. However, a rather questionable and unique Ne-
braska constitutional provision provides that no legislative act shall be held to be
unconstitutional except by the concurrency of five judges, and thus the sterilization
statute was allowed to stand. After probable jurisdiction was noted by the Supreme
Court the sterilization statute was repealed. Note, Legal Analysis and Population
Control, 84 HAv. L. REv. 1856, 1883 n.128 (1971).
177. See text accompanying note 175 supra.
178. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), where the "conduct that
shocks the conscience" test was used to invalidate search of petitioner.
179. Dembitz, supra note 2, at 144-45.
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In one sense the committee's goal, if not its method, has al-
ready received judicial approval. In Dandridge v. Williams'5 0 the
Court upheld a Maryland welfare regulation which imposed a ceiling
on welfare regulation which imposed a ceiling on welfare grants per
family, regardless of the number of children in that family. In effect,
the birth of a new child to a large welfare family resulted in a per capita
reduction in welfare assistance to every member of the family, thus re-
sulting in the "increased economic stringency" sought by the committee.
As noted above,"" the Court avoided any discussion of the population
control or family planning aspect of the regulation and upheld it largely
on the ground that it was within the State's discretion to allocate limited
welfare funds among families in this way. However, the Dandridge
decision does not provide good precedent for supporting a welfare pro-
gram which reduces the overall grant to a family upon the birth of a
new child. A Dandridge type regulation merely treats welfare families
in a manner similar to nonwelfare families: the birth of a new child
to a nonwelfare family usually results in a lower per capita income per
family member since the birth will rarely result in the wage earner
receiving more income.'8 2  The Court in Dandridge probably felt
that the birth of a new child to a welfare family did not constitution-
ally require additional grants, although, of course, such grants would
be permissible. In contrast, a reduction in a welfare family's total in-
come because of the birth of an additional child would not be analo-
gous to the private sector. Neither (in the absence of a purpose to en-
courage birth control by welfare families) could it be justified as a
rational allocation of the state's limited resources, since a large family
needs more, not less, money with the addition of a child. Even if the
state's resources were insufficient to meet all legitimate welfare needs
it would still be more rational to pay less to a three child family than to
a four child family, not the reverse.
In support of such a program it might be argued that it was bene-
ficial to the existing children in a welfare family to keep the family
small so as to reduce the incidence of neglect and other ills associated
with large families living in overcrowded conditions.183  Such an argu-
ment might be denominated a family planning argument rather than a
180. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
181. See text accompanying notes 138-44 supra.
182. Perhaps the practice of giving family allowances to military personnel,
holders of university fellowships, and others (including United Nations personnel!)
should be reviewed in the light of this discussion.
183. This is in fact the justification used in Dembitz, supra note 2, at 133.
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population control argument; it could be made irrespective of whether
there was a national population problem or not. As such, it might be
coupled with a fiscal economy argument, which would state that al-
though a reduction in welfare payments upon the birth of an additional
child (as opposed to a mere failure to increase payments) might make
no sense viewed in isolation, it might be a true economy measure in the
long run if it lowered the birth rate of welfare families. But both the
family planning argument, and the long run economy argument are
open to serious attack. Even if as a matter of economic theory it
cannot be denied that increasing the financial incentive to have fewer
children will have some effect, it seems likely that the magnitude of
the effect would be minute in comparison with the increased hardship
imposed upon the children of a welfare mother who does not restrict her
births. The average number of children desired by the poor is not dif-
ferent from the number desired by others..8 4 Poor families have many
children, not because they want large families, but because they do not
practice effective birth control. 85 Consequently, it would seem that in-
creasing the desire for small families, when such a desire exists any-
way, is unlikely to pay large dividends. Instead, it will probably
merely result in more deprivation for a group already deprived, thus
punishing a group (welfare recipients) which, in general, is unable to
avoid the "offense" of procreation.' 86
The final argument in favor of using the threat of welfare reduc-
tion or elimination to encourage contraception is based on the popu-
lation problem. It has been noted that less than 10 percent of families
with less than three children are poor, whereas more than 30 percent
of all families with five or more children are poor. Moreover, almost
one half of the poor children in the nation are in families with five or
more children.' 87  From such figures it is easy to jump to the erroneous
conclusion that our population problem is largely due to the poor (fre-
quently black) large family. On the contrary, about 85 percent of all
184. See, e.g., Statement of HEW Secretary Robert Finch, in Hearings on S.
2108 and S. 3219, before the Sub. Comn.. on Health, Family Planning & Population
Research of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.,
at 121 (1969); P. WHELPTON, A. CAMPBELL, & . PATTERSON, FERI.LriY AND
FAMILy PLANNING IN THE UNIrD STATES 240 (1966); Bumpass & Westoff, supra
note 66.
185. WHELPTON, CAMPBELL, & PATTERSON, supra note 184, at 240-45.
186. Cf. Pilpel, supra note 2.
187. See BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SER. P-60, No. 43,
CONSUMER INCOME, INCOME OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES 24,
table 5 (1964).
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children born currently are white, not black.' s8 Similarly, about 85
percent of American children (irrespective of race) are not in poverty
families.'8 9 Probably many of the 15 percent of all children who are
born into poor families are not in large welfare families. Thus,
oversized welfare families are responsible for only a fraction of our an-
nual growth, and any program to reduce population growth which
concentrated mainly on welfare families would be quite irrational.
To conclude, the Supreme Court has already approved, in Dand-
ridge, the practice of not increasing welfare payments upon the birth of
a new child to an existing large family. Apart from the reasons ad-
vanced by the Court, there is a sound birth planning rationale; such
a regulation creates an incentive to limit births in welfare families closely
analogous to that which exists in nonwelfare families, and thus is nei-
ther discriminatory nor necessarily unduly harsh. In the future we may
expect to see this device expanded. On the other hand, the proposal
to reduce monthly welfare checks upon the birth of additional child-
ren (where this will not cause "undue" hardship) is not desirable. 9 '
The argument that welfare mothers, like nonwelfare mothers, should
incur at least some pecuniary loss upon the birth of a child may be
sound, but such a goal is accomplished by merely failing to increase the
allotment upon the birth of an additional child, as in Dandridge. Inas-
much as the proposal would infringe upon a right of procreation it
could not withstand constitutional attack unless it rationally satisfied a
compelling social need. In view of the fact, shown above, that such a
measure would have only a small effect upon population growth, it is
doubtful that the Court would find such a compelling need.
Il. Conclusion
Within the last five years radical changes in the statutory and de-
cisional law concerning abortion, contraception, sterilization, and other
matters have occurred. Many of these changes were influenced, at
188. Tien, National Population Problems and Standardization of Family Size, 15
VILL. L. REv. 801, 803 (1970).
189. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 51a, at 322, table 513; BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SER. P-20, No.
205, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 18, table 5 (1970) (showing that 84.2% of the
children born to families where both parents were present in the five years preceding
March 1969 had family incomes exceeding $5,000).
190. It has even been suggested that this and similar proposals could be con-
sidered genocidal. Schwartz, The Fear that Birth Control May Mean "Genocide",
N.Y. Times, May 2, 1971, § E, at 7, cols. 1-4; cf. Hardin, supra note 2 at 574-78,
discussing the "threat of tribalism."
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least in part, by widespread concern over excessive population growth.
In the next twenty-five years additional radical developments will oc-
cur. Among these developments we may see: (1) bonus payments
to encourage nonfertility; (2) an income tax surcharge on children;
and (3) the withholding or reduction of welfare payments to those
who do not practice birth control. The first development would be con-
stitutional; the second would probably be constitutional; and the third
would probably not be constitutional.

